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Welfare State Transformation:  
Convergence and the Rise of the Supply Side Model 
ABSTRACT 
This paper describes welfare state transformation in OECD countries since the 1970s 
against the background of the post-war settlement. Relying on quantitative macro-data 
and qualitative information from the literature, we show that welfare states have con-
verged, especially regarding various spending measures, and also to a certain extent in 
some qualitative policy-making patterns. What has emerged can best be described as the 
‘supply-side welfare state’ model, and this overall orientation is reflected in many wel-
fare state areas. We differ from earlier prognoses of a race to the bottom by generous 
welfare states and disagree with the view that a supply-side orientation equals ‘lean 
government’ in terms of social expenditure. But convergence implies that the space to 
maneuver has shrunk for policy-makers. The consequences of the 2008 financial crisis 
for welfare states are difficult to predict; short-term counter-cyclical measures in reac-
tion to the crisis highlight the importance of protective buffers in highly integrated 
economies. Still, some countries have experienced harsh austerity measures since then, 
and thus the 2008 financial crisis may mark the end of the convergence period described 
here. 
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Welfare State Transformation:  
Convergence and the Rise of the Supply Side Model 
INTRODUCTION 
In the academic literature, the welfare state is understood as an institutional combination 
of a market economy with a comprehensive, rights-based system of social protection 
which includes the provision of cash benefits and social services as well as a broad set 
of regulatory policies. As a modern form of statehood, it is not confined to a few Euro-
pean countries, but extends across the Atlantic (and even further, across the Pacific to-
wards Japan and the Antipodes). Historically, its main objective was to compensate for 
income losses related to occupational risks and the vicissitudes of life such as old age, 
unemployment, work injury or death. Today, the welfare state has taken on additional 
goals – including gender equality and social investment – and it has become one of the 
heavy weight items in the public budget, attracting more than 50 per cent of total public 
expenditure in virtually all rich democracies (Castles, 2007). Yet about hundred years 
ago, the average social transfer spending share amounted only to 3.5 per cent of total 
public spending in 1910 (Cusack, 2007: 105; Lindert, 2004: 172). Much of that dra-
matic growth took place within a relatively short period that stretched from 1945 to the 
mid-1970s. The traumatic experience of war, Depression and the breakdown of democ-
racy in several countries during the ‘age of catastrophe’ of the first half of the century 
(Hobsbawm, 1994) was a crucial impetus for the creation of a new political and eco-
nomic order in the post-war era through the re-establishment of democracy, universal 
human rights and the taming of unfettered capitalism through a new financial and mone-
tary settlement agreed upon in Bretton Woods in July 1944. Already three years earlier, 
the Atlantic Charter envisaged the guarantee of basic social rights as an essential ele-
ment of the new post-war era and eventually paved the way for the more comprehensive 
catalogue of social rights embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
adopted in 1948 (Nullmeier and Kaufmann, 2010: 84-85). Framed by a growing influ-
ence of Keynesian ideas it was considered as an institutional vehicle that could help to 
smooth economic volatility, generate mass loyalty through the provision of universal 
social rights and, in consequence, to stabilize democracy. Moreover, the rebuilding of 
war-torn economies and the social needs of millions of victims of war required massive 
state interference.  
The period between 1945 and 1975 witnessed a significant extension of social rights 
to new groups of beneficiaries, higher levels of benefit generosity, eased eligibility 
rules, and the introduction of new programs such as family cash benefits or social ser-
vices. Figure 1 depicts this marked increase in average benefit generosity for four pro-
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grams in 18 advanced democracies between 1955 and 2000. Even though these charts 
mask considerable cross-national differences in welfare generosity, they illustrate not 
just the expansion, but also that this expansion of social rights came to a halt between 
the mid-1970s and early 1980s when Western democracies were hit by two consecutive 
oil shocks. However, these exogenous shocks were just the prelude of a series of occur-
rences that gave rise to a markedly changed international political economy which, 
along with fundamental transformations in society such as aging and increased female 
labor market participation, has generated a number of new challenges for advanced wel-
fare states. As figure 1 reveals, many countries responded with welfare cutbacks since 
then. However, retrenchment is not the only game in town. Most countries have struc-
turally remodeled their systems of social protection over the last three decades by im-
posing cutbacks in some policy areas while expanding benefits and adopting new priori-
ties in others in order to adapt their welfare states to a fundamentally changed environ-
ment.  
Figure 1: Average net replacement rate in 18 OECD countries, 1955-2000 
 
 
Note: Net replacement rate for an average production worker (APW) Unemployment, Sickness and Accident pro-
gram: average of four components: a) a single person vs. b) a four-person family, and c) short term (first week with 
benefits) vs. d) long term (26 weeks with benefits). Old age pensions: average of the APW replacement rate for a 
single person and a couple. 
Source: Korpi and Palme (2007). 
The goal of this working paper is to describe the broader contours of change in about 20 
‘core’ OECD welfare states since the 1970s against the background of the post-war set-
tlement. In the following sections, we will trace this transformation on the basis of both 
quantitative macro-data and qualitative information from the secondary literature. We 
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show that welfare states have partially converged, especially when it comes to various 
spending measures, but also with regard to specific qualitative policy-making patterns. 
We furthermore argue that what has emerged can best be described as the ‘supply-side 
welfare state’ model and that this new overall orientation is reflected in many sub-areas 
of the welfare state. The paper is structured as follows: The next section briefly discuss-
es the driving forces that facilitated the massive expansion of the welfare state in the so-
called ‘Golden Age’ and sheds light on the factors shaping the variation among ad-
vanced welfare states in the post-war OECD world. Then, we discuss a broad set of 
challenges to which mature welfare states are exposed since the 1970s, before sketching 
the contours of welfare state change in the post-‘Golden Age’ period and analyzing the 
transformation of the welfare state in response to these challenges. The final section 
deals with the responses to the recent global economic crisis and speculates on its long-
terms repercussions for social protection.  
THE OLD ORDER:  
POST-WAR EXPANSION AND THE VARIETY OF WELFARE REGIMES  
Much of our knowledge about the forces that have shaped the expansion of the welfare 
state in the 20th century is related to inquiries investigating cross-national differences in 
(gross) public social expenditure. Even though spending data is flawed in several re-
spects, the empirical evidence reveals a consistent picture of the determinants driving 
the spectacular growth of the welfare state in the post-war period. Demography and un-
precedented levels of economic growth are among the most important structural forces 
that facilitated a massive expansion of benefits during the bonanza years of the welfare 
state (Lindert, 2004; Wilensky, 1975), creating both rising social needs and the fiscal 
resources required for social security expansion. This was further accelerated by the 
triumph of mass democracy and the closely connected credit-claiming strategies pur-
sued by office-oriented policy-makers under conditions of fierce electoral competition 
(Pierson, 1994). Not surprisingly, social spending levels as well as benefit generosity 
remained very low in the economically backward autocratic regimes of Southern Eu-
rope.  
In the immediate post-war period, economic growth in North-western Europe was 
bolstered first by post-war reconstruction, and later by trade liberalization in the wake of 
the formation of the EC and the EFTA in the late 1950s. The deepening of economic 
integration was a further lesson of war which, however, in the beginning did not include 
free capital markets. Given restricted exit options for business and taxpayers, govern-
ments could practice redistributive policies by taxing corporations and capital and 
squeezing the wage differentials between different skill levels (Scharpf, 2000). In addi-
tion, regime rivalry between the democratic West and the communist regimes in Eastern 
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Europe contributed to the post-war expansion of the western welfare state. Facing a real 
social alternative in the East, Western governments used the provision of social rights as 
a strategy for generating mass loyalty during the Cold War (Obinger and Schmitt, 
2011). 
While all these factors provided favorable conditions for public intervention across 
the OECD, we can nevertheless observe a considerable diversity in terms of social 
spending, benefit generosity and institutional patterns. In other words, there was no sin-
gle road to the welfare state as early functionalist accounts had suggested, but rather 
various ways to and through modernity (Castles, 1998; Therborn, 1995). Comparative 
welfare state research has identified a battery of variables accounting for these cross-
national differences. To begin with, national welfare states evolved out of their unique 
institutional heritage that dates back at least to the 1880s. Spending dynamics were 
strongly related to the age of the national social security system (Wilensky, 1975) and 
early choices about basic structural program characteristics such as benefit eligibility 
rules, coverage and the mode of financing shaped subsequent developments (Alber, 
1982).  
Political factors play an overriding role for explaining cross-national policy variation 
during the 20th century. According to arguably the most prominent theoretical account 
of comparative welfare state research – the so-called ‘power resources approach’ –, the 
welfare state is an outcome of a ‘democratic class struggle’ (Korpi, 1983). Left power 
resources inside and outside parliament are considered as the main factor conducive to 
generous and universal social protection (Castles, 1978; Korpi, 1983; Stephens, 1979). 
Later on this view was modified as Christian-democratic parties were also systematical-
ly identified as powerful supporters of the welfare state, albeit in distinct ways (Manow 
and van Kersbergen, 2009; van Kersbergen, 1995). The most comprehensive welfare 
states therefore emerged in countries where government was controlled by strong left 
and/or Christian-democratic parties. Moreover, voter turn-out, contagion effects be-
tween parties, and strong trade unions have been identified as factors driving up social 
spending. By contrast, the expansion of publicly provided welfare was significantly 
constrained in political settings dominated by liberal and secular conservative parties as 
found in North America (Garrett, 1998; Hicks and Kenworthy, 1998; Hicks and Misra, 
1993; Hicks and Swank, 1992; Huber et al., 1993; Huber and Stephens, 2001).  
However, the power of pro-welfare state parties and unions is a necessary, but not a 
sufficient condition for welfare state expansion. The room to maneuver of policy-
makers is to a considerable extent preconfigured by political institutions. In fact, institu-
tional veto points have decisively impeded the expansion of the welfare state (Bonoli, 
2001; Huber et al., 1993). Examples of such institutional barriers to policy change in-
clude inter-state federalism in North-America, Australia and Switzerland (Obinger et 
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al., 2005), direct democracy (Immergut, 1992), constitutional courts or presidential veto 
powers. In consequence, veto-ridden state structures have considerably shaped the pub-
lic-private mix in welfare provision since any failure of public solutions often paved the 
way for private and occupational benefits or hidden forms of welfare provision such as 
regulation or tax expenditures (Hacker, 2002). In contrast, neo-corporatist institutions, 
which emerged in several small European countries (Cameron, 1978; Katzenstein, 
1985), turned out to be conducive to welfare state expansion.  
Another source of cross-national social policy variation that is emphasized in the lit-
erature is ethnic fragmentation. Historically, the welfare state is a child of industrializa-
tion and the nation state (Flora, 1986). The collapse of multi-national empires in the 
aftermath of World War I and the catastrophe of World War II led to high degree of 
ethnic homogeneity in most European societies (Therborn, 1995). Some scholars argue 
that ethnically homogeneous nation states were much better able to achieve legitimacy 
for a redistributive regime among its members compared with ethnically or linguistical-
ly fragmented societies such as the United States, Canada and Switzerland (Alesina and 
Glaeser, 2004; Lindert, 2004, vol. 2: 71).  
Hence, two sets of factors explain cross-national welfare state development in the 
post-war period. The first set accounts for its dramatic expansion across all OECD 
countries. The second set, however, underpins the differences that deepened between 
them. In an effort to better understand these differences, various classificatory attempts 
have been made. Esping-Andersen’s (1990) typology of three ideal-typical welfare re-
gimes is arguably the most important one (Ferragina and Seeleib-Kaiser, 2011). He dis-
tinguishes three ideal-typical welfare regimes.  
The most encompassing model of the welfare state is the social democratic regime 
that emerged in the Nordic countries under social democratic hegemony, notably in 
post-war Sweden. Benefits are universal and citizenship-based and often tax-funded. 
Active labor market policy and encompassing social services with a view to simultane-
ously unburden women from family work and to increase (female) employment are 
characteristic features of this model. Public service provision contributes to generate 
middle-class loyalty. Both benefit generosity and spending levels are high so that mar-
kets are crowded-out from benefit provision.  
By contrast, the liberal regime, to be found in the English- speaking world celebrates 
individualism, self-responsibility and an anti-state ideology. It emerged in settings with 
liberal and secular conservative incumbency. This regime only offers minimum and 
means-tested benefits as well as flat-rate insurance benefits, while the social protection 
of the better-off is left to markets and private or occupational initiative. Coverage of 
public programs is therefore low and the main objective is poverty alleviation. What is 
peculiar in some English-speaking nations is an approach relying on ‘social protection 
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by other means’ (Castles, 1989), including the large hidden welfare state based on tax 
breaks and occupational welfare in the U.S. (Hacker, 2002; Howard, 1999) and a broad 
set of regulatory policies historically protecting wage earners in the Antipodes (Castles, 
1985). In all cases, however, public benefits are meager and designed to cover only 
basic needs. 
The conservative-corporatist regime in continental Europe is arrayed between these 
poles. Its most salient factor in political terms is the pivotal role of Christian democratic 
parties. Occupational position, status, hierarchy, and the notion of a male breadwinner 
are therefore central. Benefit eligibility is attached to labor market participation and 
marriage and the level of benefits is merit-based and rises with income and the em-
ployment record. Mandatory and occupationally fragmented social insurance funded 
from contributions by employers and employees is the dominant program. Service pro-
vision, in contrast, is weakly developed as care work is traditionally left to families, i.e. 
women.  
Despite various lines of criticism (Arts and Gelissen, 2010; Scruggs and Allan, 2006; 
2008) and suggestions of additional welfare state types1, this seminal typology is still a 
very helpful heuristic device for understanding the impact of different welfare state 
types on equality, employment patterns and gender relations, their vulnerabilities in a 
changed socio-economic environment, and their reform opportunities.  
CHALLENGES TO THE OLD ORDER 
Both the academic and the political debate in the 1990s and early 2000s centered on 
external challenges to the welfare state, notably economic globalization and European 
integration. The impact of globalization – i.e. lower barriers to trade and capital flows 
between countries – may come through two main mechanisms (for overviews, see 
Genschel, 2004; Mosley, 2007; Swank, 2005). The first is regulatory and tax competi-
tion between jurisdictions. Here, the expectation is that increased exit options for capital 
leads to a ‘race to the bottom’ of regulatory levels, tax rates and, in consequence, wel-
fare state generosity and spending. The second theoretical mechanism, which is largely 
ignored in the political debate, is the so-called compensation thesis. It expects the (po-
tential) losers of economic opening to demand compensation in the form of social wel-
fare benefits (Burgoon, 2001; Hays et al., 2005). Hence the expectation that, instead of a 
race to the bottom, we should find persistent, if not increased levels of social provision, 
at least in some areas of the welfare state. While both hypotheses have been extensively 
                                                 
1  For example, Castles argues that the Antipodes maintained a so-called wage earner’s welfare state until the 
1990s, while Ferrera (1996) claims that the Southern European countries form a distinct type of their own.   
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tested (Busemeyer, 2009), no scholarly agreement has emerged so far about the overall 
impact of economic globalization on the welfare state.  
The economic dimension of European integration can be seen as a particular form of 
globalization at the regional level. The Maastricht Treaty of 1992 and the enlargement 
of the European Union (EU) to an ever more diverse group of member states drew at-
tention to questions about the impact of integration on national welfare states and the 
prospect of a supranational welfare state. Again, several channels of influence on do-
mestic welfare states are relevant and have been extensively discussed. The first channel 
is the direct impact of EU legislation in social matters. Due to a lack of competences in 
some of the core fields of the welfare state (e.g. social protection), the impact of EU 
legislation has been limited so far and earlier hopes and fears about a supranational wel-
fare state have been muted. Much more important seems the second channel, the indi-
rect impact of common market compatibility requirements, backed by a powerful Euro-
pean Court of Justice (Ferrera, 2005; Leibfried and Pierson, 1995). In addition, in-
creased cross-border competition within the common market may lead to downward 
pressures via regulatory and tax competition. Whether and to what extent European in-
tegration has put constraints on national welfare states remains controversial (Caporaso 
and Tarrow, 2009; Scharpf, 2010). It is nevertheless safe to conclude that the process of 
market-building in Europe (‘negative integration’) has put European welfare states un-
der considerable reform pressure, while the re-regulation of social policy at the EU level 
(‘positive integration’) has progressed rather slowly due to the high level of political 
consensus required for shifting policy jurisdiction to the EU level. 
Since EU social policy harmonization via ‘hard law’ is difficult to achieve, the EU 
has tried to establish a variety of ‘soft’ governance mechanisms in the social sphere 
(Trubek and Trubek, 2005). The so-called Open Method of Coordination is designed to 
spread best practices – and sometimes discourage bad practices – among member states. 
It is plausible to assume, however, that cross-border policy learning is not confined to 
the EU. Both learning and competition are increasingly seen as two mechanisms of the 
larger phenomenon of policy diffusion. While not an entirely new idea (Collier and 
Messick, 1975), policy diffusion has only recently been taken up by mainstream welfare 
state research. Diffusion studies look more closely at the interdependencies of welfare 
states and the mechanisms through which national choices are conditional on others’ 
choices (Gilardi, 2010; Obinger et al., 2013; Weyland, 2006).  
In addition to these external challenges, mature welfare states have also been con-
fronted with a broad set of domestic challenges. One results from structural economic 
change, notably the transition from industrial to post-industrial economies (Wren, 
2013). The lower productivity of the service sector reduced economic growth and led, in 
consequence, to lower wage growth. Technological progress, lower economic growth 
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and economic globalization have increased the unemployment risk of the less-educated 
workforce. Moreover, employment gains in the private service sector can often only be 
achieved at the expense of higher wage inequality unless the public sector exercises a 
compensatory function. The latter strategy, however, is increasingly foreclosed as 
mounting budgetary problems and privatizations imposed considerable limits for en-
hancing public sector employment. In addition, the higher wage premium on education 
in knowledge-based post-industrial economies increased the wage differentials between 
different skill levels. Hence, some scholars diagnosed intractable trade-offs between 
employment growth, income equality, and sound state finances (Iversen and Wren, 
1998; Scharpf, 2000). 
Moreover, higher flexibility requirements in service economies and mounting unem-
ployment are said to have increased the pressure to deregulate labor markets, giving rise 
to the spread of various forms of atypical employment such as part-time work, tempo-
rary work, or fixed-term employment. The resulting decline of standard employment 
particularly represents a major challenge for continental welfare states since precarious 
employment is, by virtue of the tight nexus between benefit levels and employment rec-
ord, translated into low welfare benefits.  
Recent decades also witnessed a massive rise of female labor market participation. 
Even though this often occurred only on a part-time basis (O'Reilly and Fagan, 1998), 
labor market entry of women increased demands for policies that help to balance em-
ployment and family work which typically has been delivered by women (Lewis et al., 
2008; OECD, 2007). In addition, traditional family patterns underwent significant 
changes over time. Rising divorce rates and an increasing number of lone parent house-
holds undercut the welfare production capacity of families and went along with higher 
poverty risks (Misra et al., 2012).  
Demography remains a permanent issue. While life expectancy has been constantly 
rising for a long time, the new challenge is the sharp decline in fertility rates since the 
1970s in many countries. This is of particular relevance for pay-as-you-go funded pen-
sion schemes as a shrinking working age population has to support a growing number of 
pensioners. Moreover, the ‘greying of society’ has increased demands for long-term 
care for the frail elderly.  
Finally, labor migration, setting in during the boom period of the 1960s, led to a 
growing ethnic heterogeneity of Western societies over time what, according to some 
scholars, will reduce solidarity in contemporary societies and drive Europe towards a 
more American-style social policy (Alesina and Glaeser, 2004). However, this scenario 
is contested in the literature. 
Taken together, risk patterns have changed considerably over time. Poverty has de-
mographically spilled downwards from the elderly to single parents, families with many 
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children and the less-educated labor force, of which many are migrants. As a result, old 
welfare states increasingly confronted with new social risks and new demands, thus 
calling not just for more welfare provision but also for a different kind of welfare state 
(Armingeon and Bonoli, 2006; Esping-Andersen et al., 2002; Taylor-Gooby, 2004). 
What is more, the political basis of the welfare state itself has been subject to a pro-
found transformation. De-industrialization and the continuing decline of the agrarian 
sector have led to the erosion of the early post-war class structure. Along with seculari-
zation these developments undercut the power resources of Social and Christian demo-
cratic parties as well as of trade unions, that is, exactly those collective actors that had 
backed the post-war expansion of the welfare state most extensively. Green parties and 
anti-welfare right-wing populists have transformed European party systems since the 
mid-1980s. Moreover, a significant part of the labor force is disenfranchised due to 
lacking citizenship, whereas the unemployed and the less-educated in precarious em-
ployment show growing tendencies of political apathy (Schäfer, 2010). On the other 
hand, well-organized welfare state constituencies such as pensioners emerged as new 
actors which forcefully defend their social entitlements (Pierson, 1994). In a nutshell, 
also the politics of social policy has undergone major changes over the past decades 
(Bonoli and Natali, 2012).  
In sum, the combination of external and domestic challenges put mature welfare state 
under considerable strain. While new risks patterns, mounting unemployment, demo-
graphic changes, and higher female labor market participation generated social needs 
and pressure for additional financial resources, lower economic growth, international 
tax competition and supranational debt limits have imposed tight fiscal constraints on 
nation states. What is more, this dilemma needs to be resolved by political systems 
which have lost a great deal of autonomy and sovereignty in the wake of Europeaniza-
tion and globalization. The next section illustrates the ways in which advanced democ-
racies have responded.  
TRANSFORMATION OF THE WELFARE STATE: A NEW ORDER? 
The size and generosity of the welfare state 
OECD welfare states have been transformed into something that most observers in the 
1980s and 1990s did not expect. There has been clear policy convergence. Yet rather 
than resembling a residual, low-expenditure, ‘liberal’ form, OECD systems of social 
protection have remained large, but transformed into increasingly market-conforming, 
‘enabling’ (Gilbert, 2002) welfare states. The new order is difficult to grasp with cate-
gories of more and less, state vs. market, public vs. private. We will try to delineate the 
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long-term transformation, starting at the most general level of analysis before drilling 
down to the level of subareas of the welfare state and more subtle qualitative changes.  
Figure 2:  Total public social expenditure as a percentage of GDP (left axis) and coef-
ficient of variation (right axis), 1980-2012 
 
Source: OECD Social Expenditure Database, OECD.stats 
First of all, despite the fears – or hopes, depending on one’s political leanings – about 
the end of an era of ‘big government’, large welfare states have not disappeared. What 
is more, it turns out that ‘big government’ is even more pervasive than ever (Pierson, 
2011). A simple look at the main aggregate indicators supports this general conclusion. 
Figure 2 displays the evolution of the unweighted mean of social expenditure ratios in 
21 OECD countries (black line), the coefficient of variation (dashed black line) and 
spending trajectories in three very different prototypical welfare states – Germany, 
Sweden, and the United States – between 1980 and 2012. The three countries are only 
used for illustrative purposes.2 Simple visual inspection reveals the main pattern. Social 
expenditure as a percentage of GDP – the common measure of ‘welfare state effort’ 
(Wilensky, 1975) – has stagnated or grown in most OECD countries, not decreased. The 
average over-time pattern we see is far from dramatic, especially compared to the three 
decades prior to 1980, and essentially in line with Peter Flora’s characterization of a 
‘growth to limits’ of the OECD welfare state (Flora, 1986). We see an upward move-
ment of the mean, combined with decreasing variation. In other words, public social 
expenditure development is marked by absolute convergence to the top, not a race to the 
bottom. This prima facie impression has been confirmed by more detailed analyses 
(Schmitt and Starke, 2011; Starke et al., 2008). For most countries, we can also detect 
                                                 
2  These three countries are often seen as near-perfect real-world approximations of, respectively, the conservative, 
the social-democratic and the liberal welfare models. 
Sfb 597 „Staatlichkeit im Wandel“ - „Transformations of the State“ (WP 180) 
- 11 - 
the impact of the worldwide recessions – in the early 1990s and, more recently, in 2009 
– on welfare effort, visible as an upwards ‘dent’ largely due to rising beneficiary num-
bers and a simultaneous decrease in the denominator (i.e. GDP). In addition, the im-
portance of the welfare state function relative to other state functions has grown rather 
than decreased over time, as the share of social expenditure relative to total government 
outlays has significantly increased since 1980 (not shown, see Castles, 2007). Differ-
ences in the level and the growth of social spending are explained by domestic socio-
economic conditions in the first place, above all, by demographic ageing, economic 
growth rates and unemployment. In contrast, the explanatory strength of political fac-
tors, including the partisan composition of government parties has disappeared in recent 
decades, according to most analyses of aggregate social expenditure (Huber and 
Stephens, 2001; Kittel and Obinger, 2003; Kwon and Pontusson, 2010). 
Looking at aggregate spending is clearly not sufficient, however. Given the increased 
demands due to changing demographics and other structural changes described earlier, 
this upwards convergence in spending perhaps masks a more subtle retreat of the state at 
the level of individual entitlements or ‘social rights’ (on the concept, see Stephens, 
2010). A central aspect of social rights is the level of income that is replaced by trans-
fers (e.g. unemployment, sickness or pension benefits) during out-of-work periods. Net 
replacement rates, a central measure of social rights, reflect the relationship between the 
(net) income of an average beneficiary relative to the (net) wage of an average produc-
tion worker. They are calculated for different household types (single household, single 
breadwinner family etc.). The most detailed data available for the time period of interest 
comes from the Welfare Entitlements Dataset compiled by Lyle Scruggs (2013). Fig-
ures 3a-d display the development of net replacement rates for four different benefits 
between 1971 and 2011. The picture is less clear-cut than for expenditure data. Espe-
cially for unemployment and sickness benefits, a great deal of change is visible but it 
seems quite heterogeneous in terms of the direction of change. Some countries have 
seen welfare state retrenchment while others have seen an expansion in benefit gener-
osity. The trend in minimum and standard pensions points upwards. Absolute conver-
gence is taking place in all benefit types except sickness benefits, and again, it is a con-
vergence to the top (pensions) or to the middle ground (unemployment), rather than a 
‘race to the bottom’. However, the existing heterogeneity within the group of OECD 
countries also indicates that replacement rates are strongly shaped by domestic political 
forces, a suggestion that is borne out by most existing studies (Allan and Scruggs, 2004; 
Amable et al., 2006; Korpi and Palme, 2003; Swank, 2005).  
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Figure 3a-d:  Average net replacement rates (left axis) and coefficient of variation 
(right axis) of unemployment benefits, sickness benefits, standard and min-
imum pensions (clockwise from top left), 1971-2011 
 
 
 
Notes: Net replacement rate data is based on hypothetical model households. For unemployment and sickness re-
placement rates the mean of a single household and a household with one full-time average earner, a dependent 
spouse and two children was calculated. For pensions, the average is based on the mean out of a single pensioner and 
a married couple. 
Source: Comparative Welfare Entitlements Dataset (Scruggs, 2006). 
The changing instruments of the welfare state 
How can we reconcile this finding that politics do matter for measures of individual 
social rights with the finding that aggregate social spending is largely driven by socio-
economic forces? One answer lies in the changing instruments the welfare state uses. 
Figure 4 shows how direct cash transfers – which reflect the individual entitlements 
included in the Scruggs database – have gradually lost in importance across the OECD 
at the expense of benefits ‘in kind’, mainly social services such as health care, public 
child care, and residential care for the elderly (Castles, 2005). Over 40 per cent of what 
is spent on social matters is now spent on services and goods, on average. Yet the rise of 
the ‘social service state’ does not follow the same rules as the traditional transfer state. 
It is associated with the socio-structural changes mentioned earlier, namely deindustrial-
ization and rising female labor force participation (Jensen, 2011b) and appears to be a 
relatively ‘apolitical’ process compared to previous expansionary periods (but see 
Gingrich, 2011; Häusermann, 2006). In sum, total spending may be increasingly shaped 
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by two different political logics at once – an old logic of the transfer state and a new 
politics of the service state – which cancel each other out in the aggregate. 
Figure 4:  Total public social expenditure in kind as a percentage of total public social 
expenditure (left axis), coefficient of variation (right axis), 1980-2010 
 
Source: OECD Social Expenditure Database, OECD.stats. 
What about social regulation, the third policy instrument in the welfare state’s toolbox? 
Unfortunately, there is very little cross-national quantitative information available about 
social policy regulation over time. One important regulatory field, however, where such 
data has become available, is labor market regulation. Figure 5 demonstrates the process 
of marked liberalization and convergence in employment protection legislation (EPL) 
(e.g. the regulation of dismissals and the use of temporary contracts). The downward 
trend is mainly driven by changes in the regulation of temporary employment, while 
liberalization has been much more moderate in the regulation of regular employment, 
thereby increasing the ‘dualizing’ divide between labor market insiders and outsiders 
(Emmenegger et al., 2012). 
Through this simple descriptive analysis of the available quantitative data, we have 
established that OECD welfare states have become more similar. Moreover, today’s 
welfare states depend relatively less on cash transfers and traditional regulatory instru-
ments (such as EPL) and more on social services. This does not mean that the old wel-
fare state is dead. On the contrary, a large body of literature has shown how change is 
heavily influenced by institutional heritage (Hacker, 2002; Pierson, 1994; 2004). The 
changes we observe are gradual developments, not sudden switches. We will now look 
at important subareas of the welfare state and describe in more detail some of the defin-
ing trends in terms of how welfare states do what they do (see Castles, 2008). On the 
basis of a review of the rich qualitative literature, we are able to discern four major 
trends: multi-pillar pensions, labor market activation, an expansion of the state’s role in 
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family policy, and experimentation with new forms of governance and funding mecha-
nisms in health care.  
Figure 5:  Strictness of employment protection (overall, left axis), coefficient of varia-
tion (right axis) 1985-2008 
 
Source: OECD Labour Force Statistics, OECD.stats. 
What welfare states do (differently) today 
In the field of old age pensions, the dominant theme has been the shift towards so-called 
‘multi-pillar’ pension systems (Clark et al., 2006; Ebbinghaus, 2011; Immergut et al., 
2007; OECD, 2009; 2011; Whiteford and Whitehouse, 2006). The World Bank promot-
ed multi-pillar pensions in the 1990s as a key to solving what was considered a looming 
‘old age crisis’ (World Bank, 1994). It claimed that the optimal pension mix rests on 
three pillars: first, a small, tax-finance basic pillar to prevent poverty in old age; second, 
an earnings-related occupational pillar and, third, individual private savings as a volun-
tary top-up. For some countries, this must have sounded like old news as they had al-
ready started to shift the task of paying for old age onto several ‘pillars’ decades ago. In 
the middle of the twentieth century, OECD pension systems divided relatively neatly 
into two types of groups: Bismarckian systems (e.g. Germany, Austria, Italy, United 
States) on the one hand, and Beveridgean systems (e.g. United Kingdom, Sweden, Can-
ada, Denmark) on the other (Hinrichs and Lynch, 2010). Things got messier afterwards. 
The Beveridge countries started to change first and supplemented their universal, flat-
rate pension with new earnings-related layers, sometimes on an occupational basis, be-
tween about the 1960s and the early 1990s.  
Bismarckian pension systems, however, tended to stick to a single social insurance 
pillar and, up to the 1990s, reforms took place within the inherited institutions. Bis-
marckian countries also have the highest levels of public pension expenditure combined 
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with the least favorable demographic outlook (the United States excepted). It comes as 
no surprise that calls for pension reform grew louder in these countries. From the late 
1990s onwards, most Bismarckian countries legislated significant structural changes. 
The future direction of pension systems across the OECD has clearly been tilted into a 
multi-pillar direction. Apart from some cutbacks to first-pillar pensions – some of which 
will come into full effect only after a long phase-in period – second and third-pillar pen-
sions were added to the mix. Most Bismarckian countries have either added mandatory 
occupational or private pensions (e.g. Sweden) or subsidize and regulate private retire-
ment savings much more extensively than before (e.g. Germany).  
On the whole, Bismarckian and Beveridgean countries have to some extent con-
verged, which is also suggested by the quantitative indicators (see above). Overall, the 
lines between public and private have become much murkier (Béland and Gran, 2008). 
It could even be argued that the role of the state has not greatly diminished but new 
tasks of financial regulation and consumer protection have been added that used to be 
anathema in pension policy. Differences remain, however, in terms of the average level 
of benefits guaranteed by the state, the extent of redistribution, and the role the state 
plays vis-à-vis private provision in terms of subsidization and regulation. Negative con-
sequences have also arisen from multi-pillar reform. The financial crisis of 2008 was a 
powerful demonstration of the potential for political conflict that comes with a shift 
towards promoting more private retirement savings. Moreover, given changes in family 
structures, mass unemployment and the spread of atypical work, there is a real danger 
that pension reforms aimed at cost saving also lead to higher inequality and poverty in 
old age (Meyer et al., 2007), which is why some countries have already improved min-
imum retirement income schemes.  
Labor market policy used to be mainly about passive income replacement during un-
employment spells (Sjöberg et al., 2010). The insurance of employees stood at the cen-
ter and benefits were typically earnings-related to allow for a maintenance of an 
achieved individual living standard during temporary joblessness. High unemployment 
benefits also had the positive side-effect to act as Keynesian automatic stabilizers during 
downturns. Active labor market policy (ALMP) did exist in some countries – Sweden is 
a positive outlier in this respect – but, overall, did not have such a predominant role. 
The persistence of structural and long-term unemployment in the 1980s and 1990s led 
to changing goals and instruments of labor market policy in all OECD countries, albeit 
to a varying extent. Arguably, this development was influenced by initiatives at the lev-
el of the OECD and the EU in the 1990s (Casey, 2004; Mosher and Trubek, 2003; 
OECD, 1994). Labor market activation has become the term to describe this transfor-
mation (Kenworthy, 2010: 435-437, provides an overview of the reasons and causes of 
activation). 
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A huge variety of activation reforms can be observed across the OECD (Eichhorst et 
al., 2008; King, 1995; Lødemel and Trickey, 2001). The most important measures in-
clude cutbacks of some passive benefits (especially long-term benefits), stricter re-
quirements in terms of individual job search and participation in special programs. 
Many countries, however, have also improved services for the unemployed (and for 
potential employers), including better job search assistance, access to child care and 
training measures. One method of increasing employment has been to ‘make work pay’, 
either through benefit cutbacks or through in-work benefits (e.g. by relaxing means tests 
or by introducing tax benefits for low wage earners) (Nolan, 2006). 
Different approaches to activation differ in their mix of stick and carrot or, put dif-
ferently, between ‘workfare’ and more ‘enabling’ instruments (Dingeldey, 2007). An-
other  distinction is based on whether a broad array of policy instruments (beyond the 
more traditional instruments of ALMP) are used and whether the goal is long-term em-
ployment in ‘good’ jobs or just employment (Kenworthy, 2010). It is also possible to 
distinguish between demand-side measures – e.g. public jobs creation, employer subsi-
dies, short-time working schemes – and supply-side measures – e.g. work requirements, 
placement services, training. Notwithstanding this diversity, there are common themes 
that have emerged across virtually all countries since about the 1980s. In essence, in-
stead of just insuring participants in the labor market against the consequences of un-
employment, activation is driven by the goal of increasing overall labor market partici-
pation and particularly the employability of those at the margins of the labor market. 
Since many who are to be ‘activated’ are not even among the registered unemployed, 
activation often entails coordinating or integrating labor market schemes with social 
assistance, education and training, and family policy. Hence, and despite continuing 
differences within the activation approach, it can be argued that qualitative policy con-
vergence – or ‘contingent convergence’ (Konle-Seidl and Eichhorst, 2008) – has taken 
place in the labour market policy of OECD countries. 
Across the OECD, family policy has gained a prominence it never had in the history 
of the welfare state. As mentioned before, this is true at the level of expenditure. Ex-
penditure on families (cash and in-kind) has increased since 1980 and now stands at 2.5 
per cent of GDP (OECD-21 average). Compared to the big program areas such as old 
age and health care, this share is still relatively small. But even beyond the question of 
resources, family policy has been transformed into something new (Bahle, 2008). When 
it emerged in the post-war years – there had been very little activity in this field before 
1945 – it was often geared towards the male breadwinner model and its main goal was 
to compensate for the cost of raising children and the alleviation of poverty. But there 
were differences between countries, which still affect current trajectories. In many 
countries – especially Catholic countries or countries marked by historical religious 
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conflicts – the family realm was almost off-limits for the state and family policy was 
mainly guided by the ‘subsidiarity’ principle.  
The goals and instruments of family policy have since diversified and have been 
aligned much more with overall economic and labor market policy objectives and, at 
least in part, with goals of gender equality (Lewis, 2009). In line with the activation 
paradigm, the focus is increasingly on raising mothers’ employment rates, the reconcili-
ation of employment and family and on early investment in children (Esping-Andersen 
et al., 2002; OECD, 2007). Of course, the extent to which this is done differs markedly 
across countries. ‘New’ family models such as the dual earner/dual carer model 
(Gornick and Meyers, 2006) are far from universally dominant. In Southern and large 
parts of Continental Europe, a lack of adequate childcare facilities and various disincen-
tives built into the system of taxes and transfers still make it hard for parents to share 
care and paid work in an egalitarian manner (Ciccia and Verloo, 2012; Lewis et al., 
2008). And while some of these ‘laggard’ countries have recently started to move, oth-
ers, including countries such as Greece and Switzerland but also the United States and 
some other English-speaking countries, are in risk of falling behind. The pioneers in 
Northern Europe do not stand still and keep updating their family policy arrangements, 
despite some more traditional turns in Denmark and Finland in recent years. This wid-
ening gap between the North and much of the rest is also reflected in the lack of a clear 
convergence trend in family policy (Ferrarini, 2006; Gauthier, 2002). In sum, family 
policy has been expanded – especially in the sense of work-family reconciliation policy 
–, but the picture remains diverse, and sometimes contradictory, across the OECD.  
Health care has been another field of unequivocal welfare state expansion. With the 
average share of GDP spent by general government on health care increasing from 5 in 
1980 to 7.5 per cent in 20093(OECD-21), the issue of budgetary pressure has certainly 
gained in importance – although it cannot be claimed that costs are ‘exploding’ in any 
sense of the word. Upwards convergence in spending levels is even stronger in health 
care than in other sub-areas of the welfare state (Starke et al., 2008). This upwards trend 
is fuelled by several sources (see Freeman and Rothgang, 2010: 372, for an overview), 
including rising income levels, technological and medical progress and so-called 
‘Baumol’s cost disease’ according to which services such as health care become more 
expensive over time because productivity increases in services are slower than in manu-
                                                 
3  Private funding sources added another 2.7 percentage points in health spending, on average, in 2008. This figure, 
however, is heavily driven by the United States where voluntary and mandatory private health care spending 
amounted to 6.1 per cent of GDP in 2009. 
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facturing but wages are not adjusted accordingly.4 Greater cost awareness has led to 
health care reforms in virtually all OECD countries. There is little evidence of benefit 
retrenchment in health care – quite the contrary, the overall trend appears to be a con-
tinuous expansion of the amount and quality of services. Instead of cutting back ser-
vices, there has been numerous attempts to make health systems more efficient through 
structural and regulatory reform (Freeman and Moran, 2000; Freeman and Rothgang, 
2010; Giaimo and Manow, 1999; Rothgang et al., 2010).  
The starting points of these structural reforms were very different, however. Tradi-
tionally, health systems can be broadly grouped into tax-based and state-administered 
NHS systems and social insurance systems which are contribution-financed and corpo-
ratist in terms of administration. Private insurance systems are more a theoretical possi-
bility than a reality, but the old Swiss health system and the U.S. health system (at least 
for large parts of the population) come closest to this third type. Since the late 1980s, 
countries have experimented with novel ways of health care financing and governance 
(Böhm et al., 2012; Götze and Schmid, 2012). Reform has become an almost constant 
theme in countries like the UK and Germany. The latest and most prominent example 
has been the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act in the United States 
(‘Obamacare’) which, among other things, introduced an insurance mandate and a 
stronger regulation of private health insurers. Interestingly, the result of these experi-
ments has often been that more state-dominated countries (such as the UK and New 
Zealand) have used the market mechanism for internal allocation of public funding. 
Systems that traditionally counted on fragmented private markets (e.g. Switzerland) or 
on self-regulation by health providers and insurance funds (e.g. Germany, the Nether-
lands), on the other hand, have tended to use hierarchical monitoring mechanisms and 
direct state intervention to curb costs. Moreover, some social insurance countries have 
also experimented with increased market incentives alongside corporatist and hierar-
chical regulation. Rothgang et al. interpret this pattern as a structural convergence of 
health care systems: ‘Healthcare systems show increasing similarities, as they often in-
clude innovative policies or transfer policies developed in other healthcare systems, 
while preserving their inherited basic features. Healthcare systems thus develop into 
more hybrid system types […]’ (2010: 8).  
CONCLUSION 
The welfare state is not on the retreat, it is not even clearly stagnating. Some areas are 
marked by retrenchment but others – family policy, health care and long-term care – are 
                                                 
4  Despite frequent claims to the contrary, demographic ageing is not (yet) the main cause of spending increases 
(Castles, 2008; Getzen, 1992; Palangkaraya and Yong, 2009).  
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fields of expansion, not retrenchment. Moreover, OECD welfare states are more similar 
today than 30, 40 years ago. Welfare states are also less transfer-intensive and (labor 
market) regulation has been liberalized in many highly-regulated countries. However, 
several qualifications are in order regarding the process of welfare state convergence. 
First, absolute convergence is strongest with regards to social expenditure. In some sub-
areas of the welfare state, it is stronger than in others. Convergence can be observed in 
pensions, labor market policy and health care. Family policy is marked not by conver-
gence – perhaps not yet –but rather by a common trend of expansion. Second, conver-
gence is gradual and has not led to uniformity. Differences in size and structure persist 
between welfare states. Despite some blurring of regimes it can be demonstrated empir-
ically that countries still cluster pretty much in line with the welfare regime types identi-
fied by Esping-Andersen and similar welfare state typologies (Castles and Obinger, 
2008; Obinger and Wagschal, 2010: 341). Third, while some studies have shown that 
convergence is driven by economic globalization (Jensen, 2011a; Schmitt and Starke, 
2011), the process does not resemble the race to the bottom expected by much of the 
literature in the 1990s. Globalization is not the end of big government, but it has con-
strained the room to manoeuver of policymakers. 
As the narrative of the end of the national welfare state has lost plausibility, how can 
we then make sense of these developments in the OECD world? What does the ‘steady-
state welfare state’ (Castles, 2004) resemble? Almost twenty years ago, Bob Jessop 
coined the term ‘Schumpeterian workfare state’ (1993) to capture the turn from Keynes-
ian demand management to a focus on employability and individual labor supply. An-
other candidate is the ‘enabling state’ (Gilbert, 2002). The advantage of both concepts is 
that they focus not on a retreat of the state per se, but on changes in the way how the 
welfare state intervenes in markets and their outcomes. Yet they also seem overly fo-
cused on labor market policy, whereas changes in family policy, health care are not well 
reflected in these terms. Recently, Bonoli (2013) has described the changes in family 
and labor market policy simply as ‘active social policy’, whereas Hemerijck has pro-
posed the term ‘social investment state’ (2012). All these classifications reflect im-
portant aspects and trends of welfare state transformation over the past 30 years, but 
they also tend to over-simplify the rich empirical diversity of welfare state experiences 
in the OECD world across the different sub-areas, from pensions to family policy. In 
our view, a possible term for capturing all the nuances of welfare state transformation is 
the ‘supply side- welfare state’. The term refers to the concern about individual 
(dis)incentives in terms of labor market participation, investment and other supply-side 
factors that underlies much current social policy-making. The term is broad enough to 
include activation, employability and social investment and to reflect the growing im-
portance of incentives based on internal markets and market-compatible social provision 
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in contemporary advanced welfare states. The supply-side welfare state stands in obvi-
ous contrast to the demand-side oriented Keynesian welfare state of the post-war dec-
ades. This distinction should be seen as ideal-typical rather than as a clear-cut empirical 
finding. The emphasis on countercyclical spending in many OECD countries in the af-
termath of the financial crisis of 2008, which often involved welfare state schemes, 
demonstrates that the break with the past is incomplete and ambiguous.  
In terms of the social outcomes of the emerging new post-industrial constellation, it 
seems that mature welfare state face increasing difficulties to deliver on their egalitarian 
promise. Income inequality almost everywhere increased (OECD, 2008), with recent 
labor market developments characterized by a hardening divide between well-protected 
insiders and a growing number of outsiders, i.e. the unemployed and atypically em-
ployed. In addition, the old class-conflict seems increasingly substituted by new social 
cleavages along gender, ethnicity, educational attainment and age.  
Of course, the future of the welfare state is open but there is not much reason for op-
timism in the years to come. The long-term impact of the financial crisis of 2008 and 
the recession that followed as well as the outfall of the sovereign debt crisis becomes 
more and more evident. In the short-run, the welfare state has been actively used as a 
short-term crisis manager and welfare state cutbacks have been the exception rather than 
the rule (Starke et al., 2013; Taylor-Gooby, 2012). In the medium and long term, how-
ever, the repercussions of the fiscal crisis will negatively affect public welfare provision 
in several countries. The recent burst of public debt, the sheer fiscal weight of mature 
welfare states, and the fact that many countries have already curtailed public expendi-
ture in areas such as defense, economic affairs and education in recent past (Castles, 
2007) implicate that future austerity packages can no longer spare the welfare state. At 
least for the heavily indebted countries it is thus very likely that the real age of perma-
nent austerity begins now (Pierson, 2011; Schäfer and Streeck, 2013). In fact, several 
countries have already imposed draconic cutbacks of welfare benefits with significant 
repercussions for social cohesion and democratic politics. It may well be that the con-
vergence we have observed in the last three decades will stop and a new divergence will 
open up between welfare states trapped in a spiral of low economic growth, high public 
debt and painful austerity measures on the one hand and the countries on the way to-
wards recovery on the other.  
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